[anti-abuse-wg] FW: [aa-wg-chair] Draft Anti-Abuse WG Minutes from RIPE 79

In message <DB7PR06MB5017909EC93E301C76BA47C694510 at DB7PR06MB5017.eurprd06.prod.
outlook.com>, Brian Nisbet <brian.nisbet at heanet.ie> wrote:

>Ruediger said that... [when] he looks at routing tables, he sees a lot
>of odd stuff including faked origin ASes, AS paths that are not
>technically valid, in RPKI – ROAs for ASNs that should not show up
>for public routing. Looking at RPKI, reputation does not help because
>in RPKI there are authorisation forecasts that are completely invalid.

Due to my general ignorance of these matters, I would very much like to
be shown some real-world and current examples of each of the above three
alleged problems, i.e.:

    *)  faked origin ASes

    *)  AS paths that are not technically valid

    *)  ROAs for ASNs that should not show up for public routing.

I hope that Ruediger is on this list, and that he will provide me with at
least one or two examples of each of the above.

My thanks to him in advance for this.


Regards,
rfg