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[anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
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Carlos Friaças
cfriacas at fccn.pt
Sat Apr 20 00:25:09 CEST 2019
On Fri, 19 Apr 2019, Gert Doering wrote: > Hi, > > On Fri, Apr 19, 2019 at 02:18:25PM +0000, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote: >> It would be an interesting sight to see the chairman and exec board of ripe summoned before a parliament or court to explain the situation. > > You love to summon up dire legal consequences for the RIPE NCC if this > policy isn't coming into place. > > Over here in Europe, we're not used to just sueing anyone for anything we > do not like and actually having chance in succeeding with it. Unless > the RIPE NCC is actually *tasked* with "ensuring routing correctness" Hi, RIPE NCC isn't tasked with that, i agree. It is also not tasked in ensuring that party A is just using their own numbering resources. But 2019-03 also doesn't mandate that the RIPE NCC should start verifying that randomly. It just opens the door for someone to report a (suspected) resource hijack, and if a large set of circumstances are aligned, it may open the door to a membership status review -- which won't even happen at the first time... according to the current set of policies. > (which it isn't) whether or not someone configures their router correctly > cannot construct a liability for the NCC. Maybe it can be a liability if the party responsible for the numbering resources administration does nothing and let's the hijacks run free... Some years ago i had an issue with another RIR about one of its members adding *our address* to one of their netblocks. That registry (whois) entry was clearly forged (the network wasn't and never was running at our address) and it took months to have this corrected with the people who forged the entry and the RIR in question didn't really help. If we had financial losses due to this incorrect entry, wouldn't it be normal to sue also the RIR for not aiding in solving this "address hijack" that hit the registry database??? > Now, if the NCC neglects to secure their *registry*, and people can > use this neglect to attack others, this might be a valid case to bring > forward... Big Kudos to those who have worked hard to try to close this gap lately (also through policy proposals) -- you know who you are... :-)) Regards, Carlos > Gert Doering > -- NetMaster > -- > have you enabled IPv6 on something today...? > > SpaceNet AG Vorstand: Sebastian v. Bomhard, Michael Emmer > Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14 Aufsichtsratsvors.: A. Grundner-Culemann > D-80807 Muenchen HRB: 136055 (AG Muenchen) > Tel: +49 (0)89/32356-444 USt-IdNr.: DE813185279 >
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