[anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)

On Thu, 18 Apr 2019, Peter Koch wrote:

(...)
>>>> BGP hijacking completely negates the purpose of a (Regional Internet) Registry.
>>>
>>> This is unclear to me.  The Registry registers address space, not routes.
>>
>> Yes, but one of the main purposes of a Registry is that everyone knows who
>> is using a specific resource (or who is the legitimate holder).
>
> Definitely the registry puts on record who the holder is, I'm not
> sure that always includes "use".

Without any rights of use attached, the value of having a registry is 
close to none.

If someone hijacks a resource to engage in a criminal activity, then the 
value for the legitimate holder of having a reference in the registry can 
be even *negative*, if he's forced to prove that he actually didn't have 
any part in said criminal activity...



>> Those who are intentionally and continuously hijacking resources are
>> removing value from the Registry for the whole community.
>
> Quite to the contrary.  Without the registry you couldn't even tell.

Step 1 - Have a registry. Check.
Step 2 - Make people abide by the registy. Oooops. :/



>> What's the point in having a Registry if people just decide which numbers to
>> use, even if those Internet numbers are attached to another org with
>> legitimate holdership and exclusive rights of usage?
>
> That question answers itself.  Even more so, what's the point of removing
> the resources registered by those "people" if they allegedly don't care
> anyway?

If an hijacker loses the rights to use its ASN, their peers/upstreams 
will likely need to review their configs/neighborships...



>> The rule, as we speak doesn't exist. Maybe using different wording, it could
>> mean: "Resource hijacking is not allowed". Period.
>
> While "hijacking" still needs to be defined, the statement in and of
> itself is not a policy.

We hope to improve the definition in version 2.0.

I disagree when you say "<something> is not allowed" is not a policy.



>> So, the main/only course of action, as i see it today for an hijacked party
>> (if the hijacker is from the RIPE region), is sending a complaint to a dutch
>> court... and it's doubtful if the dutch court will not rule itself to be
>> "unable to rule" on the matter...
>
> Why would you ask the Dutch court?

It's the only court who can rule that the RIPE NCC needs to do 
something...


> Thanks to the Registry DB, the hijacked party is hopefully able to prove 
> holdership of a resource to take mitigation to the operational level.

Hopefully, yes.
But that won't stop the hijacker to hop on to the next hijack/victim...

Again, we're focusing on the hijacked party as the sole victim, when those 
who *receive* hijacked routes are also the victims, as their traffic is 
attracted from such bogus announcements.


Cheers,
Carlos


> -Peter
>