[anti-abuse-wg] AS43890

Hi Ronald,

> It now seems certain to me that the absence of anything even remotely
> approximating proper validation of RIPE route objects is not, in fact,
> a problem which is limited to just inter-RiR situations.  Apparently,
> RIPE member LIRs can just as easily hijack the IP blocks of other
> RIPE members as they can in the case of IP blocks belonging to parties
> in other regions.

I don't think so...

To be able to create the route object

route:           188.229.1.0/24
descr:           Netserv-Client
origin:          AS43890
mnt-by:          NETSERV-MNT
source:          RIPE

Authorisation from both the address block

inetnum:         188.229.0.0 - 188.229.63.255
netname:         LTE-4G
descr:           new service for data
country:         IR
admin-c:         RL7844-RIPE
tech-c:          RL7844-RIPE
status:          ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by:          MCCI-MNT
source:          RIPE

and the AS number

aut-num:         AS43890
as-name:         NETSERV-AS
descr:           Netserv Consult SRL
[...]
org:             ORG-SNCS6-RIPE
status:          ASSIGNED
mnt-by:          NETSERV-MNT
mnt-by:          RIPE-NCC-END-MNT
mnt-routes:      NETSERV-MNT
source:          RIPE

is required. So the route cannot be created unless MCCI-MNT and NETSERV-MNT both authorise it.

I understand that the route objects look a little weird, but what makes you think that it is an authorisation problem in the RIPE DB that made it possible for someone to create them?

Cheers,
Sander