[anti-abuse-wg] Authorities, or lack thereof

In message <51C469A3.5020404 at heanet.ie>, 
Brian Nisbet <brian.nisbet at heanet.ie> wrote:

>>> The WG can of course make the NCC aware of a bad operator
>>
>> With what effect, exactly?  To what end?  Do you see what I mean?  If such
>> information transmission (to NCC) occurs, and if no allocations ever change
>> as a result, then what was the point?
>
>I do see what you mean, but I was answering the questions you asked. 
>Without a policy change, likely agreed to by the NCC membership (which 
>opens up a whole different can of stakeholder interaction worms) there 
>would be no automatic action. However such a notification may trigger an 
>audit and the NCC's only processes, which may in turn lead to action 
>under the procedures as currently documented.

In case anyone missed it, it was exactly the above snippet from the
discussion that Brian and I have been having here on the list that
prompted my set of three proposals.

I am forced to agree that it appears, even to me, that it is rather
unlikely that the RIPE membership would vote _anybody_ the authority
to simply kick a given person or company out of RIPE altogether, EVEN IF
all available evidence points to said party being the absolute scum of
the earth (and guilty of hacking, cracking, spamming, running botnets
and generally being a menace to all of mankind).  I wish this were not
true, but at present it appears that it is.

So consider _that_ idea tabled (please).  But just as Brian said, there
is the established NCC audit process.  Presumably, within that process
any party undergoing an audit receives a full and fair review, and
an opportunity to be heard... or what we here in the states call "due
process".

It does not seem unreasonable to begin such a process in cases where there
exists probable cause to believe that some party has broken the already
established rules relating to allocations and their justifications.


Regards,
rfg