[address-policy-wg] 2013-03 New Draft Document and Impact Analysis Published (No Need - Post-Depletion Reality Adjustment and Clean up)

Malcolm:
I find your arguments against 2013-3 to be unusually off target. Let's begin with this:

-----Original Message-----

> I am not convinced by the the principle argument being made in favour of abolishing the concept of "need"

The policy change does not "abolish the concept of need" it only removes it for the remaining scraps of the last /8 in IPv4, and for transfers of that space.
My understanding is that some kind of demonstrated need would still be in place for IPv6. 

> Finally, as noted by the RIPE NCC, this takes away a key message the RIRs have used to justify their independence 
> from government. That may not be sufficient reason to oppose the policy if it is otherwise necessary, 
> but it does seem to me to indicate caution and counsel against acting precipitously.

This argument I simply don't understand. The presence or absence of needs assessment has absolutely nothing to do with the status of RIRs as independent membership nonprofit who administer a shared private resource space. 

Waving the bloody flag of the ITU really doesn't cut it here. As a private organization, RIRs have to be very careful about competition policy considerations. In this respect, needs assessment, which is completely nontransparent and could in some respects be considered more easily manipulated than a market, puts RIRs in much more danger of external scrutiny than an open and uncontrolled market for IPv4 transfers. 

When you say there are governments out there who want to take over number allocation, you are correct. But as someone who is as familiar with that environment as you are, I can tell you with complete confidence that these governments don't care a whit whether RIRs eliminate needs assessment or not: they want power in the hands of states, and neither passing nor not passing this policy will have any impact on the course of that debate. 

Indeed, your view could backfire. It would not be difficult to make a case that continued controls on allocations keep the price of number blocks artificially low for buyers, and by the same token suppress the market for sellers by eliminating many potential buyers from the market. Since most of the dues-paying members of RIRs are ISPs/buyers, it would not be too hard to paint a picture of this situation as a buyers' cartel, which would be actionable under antitrust law. If you think needs assessments are protecting RIRs from external interest and possible intervention, you are 180 degrees off the mark.

>The Conservation policy, even as stated, expresses *two separate* 
> policy objectives: 'fair distribution', and maximising the lifetime of the public address pool. 
> Depletion means that reality has superseded the second objective, but not necessarily the first.
> So my first question to Tore is: "Why should 'fair distribution' of addresses between users no longer be 
> considered an overarching objective of IPv4 address management?"

The simple answer to your question is that needs assessment are not "fairness assessments." If there are 50 ISPs contending for the same number block, needs assessment only tells you whether they cross some threshold (largely theoretical and unenforced) of operational justification. It may be the case that 2 or 3 of those ISPs have far greater merit in their claim than the other 47 or 48. Current practice doesn't care about that. Your argument falls on this simple fact alone. 

> 2. "Fair distribution" establishes a basic goal for IPv4 address management policy. 
> Other policies exist to pursue that goal.

Your second statement here is an unjustified logical leap. There is nothing in the current policy that either defines what "fairness" is or that makes it the overriding concern, more important than efficiency and conservation. One could argue that when there is scarcity it is more fair for people willing to pay the highest price to get the resource. I know that that logic doesn't always work, and doesn't always seem fair, but it does work for about 90% of the economy as a whole.

My view is that when we are dealing with the final scraps of the v4 space and thousands of claimants can all claim that they "need" numbers, it is indeed the most fair option to give it to the person who bids the highest. Not that this is a wonderful option, only that it is better than the alternatives, including arbitrary, nontransparent, bureaucratically demanding needs assessments. 

> limiting the maximum allocation size directly relies upon the notion of fairness 
> (we're only giving you X, even though you want Y, so that the next guy can have some at all). 

Yes, we still have the one /22 restriction. Indeed, the last /8 policy giving one small block to a customer is based on a fairness principle. That policy is not fundamentally changed by the elimination of needs assessment; the most important aspect of the policy is the limitation of one block per customer. Absence of needs assessment will not have much impact on that basic operation of that policy. 
And so you have completely refuted your own argument that there is no "fairness" left in the system if 2013-3 passes.

> With the introduction of a transfer mechanism, it is possible that market pressures 
> may prove adequate to ensure efficient and fair allocation of IPv4 addresses; in this 
> transition period, the consequences of run-out are uncertain. RIPE has chosen not 
> to act pre-emptively, to give market mechanisms a chance to succeed. However if 
> market mechanisms prove inadequate to safeguard the fair and efficient use of IPv4 
> address space, RIPE stands ready to introduce new measures as necessary."

So, you are suggesting that we pass 2013-3 with this language added? The idea is not an entirely bad one, but as currently drafted the statement is unclear. It should read something more like this: 

> With the introduction of a transfer mechanism and the elimination of needs assessments
> for IPv4, we are assuming that market pressures 
> will prove adequate to ensure efficient and fair allocation of IPv4 addresses.
> However if market mechanisms prove inadequate to safeguard the fair and 
> efficient use of IPv4 address space, RIPE stands ready to introduce new measures as necessary."

Such a disclaimer may not be necessary, because RIPE can always change its policies. But if it gains more support to put it that way, go ahead!

--MM