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[address-policy-wg] 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) going to Last Call
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Andy Davidson
andy at nosignal.org
Tue May 10 14:57:29 CEST 2011
On 3 May 2011, at 12:31, Malcolm Hutty wrote: > [2] For example, could we creates "webs of trust" rather than a single > hierarchy? Would that be "good enough" or is a hierarchy essential? I am strongly in favour of resource certification, but appeared (until RIPE62) to be labouring under the misapprehension that this web (rather than hierarchy) system was the thing that we are building. Thank you for raising the point, Malcolm. The Utopia, for me, is that a certificate would be valid if the NCC, *or* ARIN, *or* APNIC, *or* ..., *or* MOON-NIC, *or* Certs Inc, *or* Randy, or even my private CA had signed it, because no single regulator in any jurisdiction would be able to revoke my certificate and prevent routing. I get the benefits of automation, and the benefits of certification, without having to carry the risk of an 'internet off' switch. Is it too late for this ? Please say not. Andy
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