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[address-policy-wg] layer 10+ issues with 2008-08
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Erik Bais
ebais at a2b-internet.com
Mon May 9 13:33:45 CEST 2011
Hi Andreas, > > However since Sander said the lawyer says there's no way the Dutch > > courts could issue such a court order, this seems to be unrealistic > > unless there's new legislation. Though I wonder about the EU > > Go and ask the lawyers if a court can order "effective measures" to > stop a certain route being announced. This can be a filtering at AMS-IX > and other exchanges, blocking it at a peer level or revoking a > certificate. I a worst case szenarion, interpretation is up the the LEA > and the NCC the most likely target. I strongly disagree with you here. If one would like to stop a route to be announced, the best way is at the originating router. The AMS-IX or any other IX don't have ANYTHING to say in what an ISP is announcing. They don't want too and since they are not in the AS path of the routes, they simply can't. Trying to depeering a party is 'probably' the second best option, especially if the originating router / infrastructure is owned by the same (offending ?) party. However the experiences with that in the past with parties like McColo and alikes, that isn't something that will happen overnight. Erik
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