[address-policy-wg] 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) going to Last Call

On May 4, 2011, at 8:48 PM, Martin Millnert wrote:

> ...
> Network C and D are transit customers of tier-1 network E.
> ...
> Network D announces prefix 1 to E.
> 
> Transit provider E, being a very large company, has after some
> government pressure decided to enable strict RPKI filtering 
> ...
> Only a single network, E, implemented strict filtering of RPKI, yet A,
> not being a customer of E, lost access to 1, and all involved hardware
> is still functional.

Prefix 1 is for customer D (of network E); ergo, A lost access to D 
because D's choice of service provider.  D voluntarily choose its 
service provider, and can always choose another.  There is no party 
that was impacted without a choice; D choose A because of their much
discussed "route assurance" technology, and that turned out (in your 
example) to be a bad choice.  Another example might have it be a wise 
choice, but there's still no one impacted who didn't get  any choice.  

How is this different than network D deciding to build a network with
with an innovative routing technology, which may serve to distinguish
it in a positive (or negative) manner based on actual performance? 

Back to my original question:  "I understand how it would impact the 
network which has decided to make use of strict RPKI-based route 
validation (and therefore the network's customers by extension), but 
can you explain how it would otherwise effect that network's peers?"

Thanks,
/John