[address-policy-wg] 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) going to Last Call

On Wed, May 04, 2011 at 05:24:12PM +0100, Brian Nisbet wrote:

>I really don't think it does. You seem to be imagining a scenario where
>a national governement would just ring up the NCC and say, "revoke these
>certs." I have seen no evidence to suggest this risk is anything close
>to real.

This has already happened, not a week ago the DHS (who else?) seized the 
domains of various online poker sites. TTBOMK similar has happened in 
the EU as well. I even seem to remember some organisation calling for 
RIPE to de-register certain resources. (Possibly the NCC care to 
enlighten us as to whether anything came of that?)

> I suspect that a for profit global megacorp running such a
> certification system would be far more vulnerable to such measures, but
> even then, I don't see this as a large risk.

Absolutely. Wikileaks <> Visa, Mastercard, Paypal, Verisign, &c? I think 
that is a *very* large risk indeed and I'd never propose to host the 
central authority for my routing to $private_corp either. Unless there 
are a lot of them, preferably in a lot of different countries...

rgds,
Sascha