[address-policy-wg] 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) going to Last Call

Dear address-policy-wg,

I, too, share many of the concerns Malcolm (and others following on his
comments) voiced here. I do not feel that this policy should be adopted.

In addition to many of the philosophical and political concerns outlined by
Malcolm (whom I would like to thank for putting them down in writing so
eloquently) as to why this policy might effectively be a Pandora's box of
undesirable outcomes - I also find the resources allocated by the RIPE NCC
internally to RPKI efforts would be much better used if applied to furthering
the usability, tooling, and user education for RPSL, which, in my opinion offers
many of the capabilities the proponents of RPKI expect to see from the
implementation of this policy.

RPSL as a mechanism is at least partially implemented by many participants in
the DFZ today, and it can be reasonably argued that by adding as little as a
scalable and SSL/TLS-secured interface to the RIPE whois database, the goal of a
single trust anchor containing 'definitive' information on the ownership of each
allocated and assigned resource in machine-readable format is already achieved.

This information, in turn, can be used both by BSS/OSS systems and, if
implemented, directly by network devices to make decisions on the validity of
routing information.

With all this in mind, I can not support this policy.

--
Respectfully yours,

David Monosov


On 05/03/2011 01:31 PM, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
> I am afraid I don't believe this policy should be adopted at this time.
>