[address-policy-wg] Proposal 2010-2

 
> And even there're some economical implications, the proposal itself
> isn't primary about money and cost of IPv4 address, this is technical
> proposal. It's about address distribution to new and existing LIRs.

As long as addresses are scarce, there is no such thing as a purely technical allocation proposal. 
Any allocation mechanism involves a competitive relationship among LIRs for available resources, and any policy distributes costs and benefits among the contending parties.

> And we have to care about new LIRs, we need to reserve some address space
> for them - as lots of internet resources will be accessible only over
> IPv4 for long period after depletion. It's about survivance of free
> allocatable IPv4 address space as long as possible.

I agree with this concern, but you seem unaware of the possibilities of strategic behavior by LIRs. 

Consider:
LIR 1, an incumbent, proves it needs a /16 to meet demand caused by growth in the number of its existing customers. 
LIR 2, a startup, also proves it needs a /16 to start up

Your policy privileges any actor in the category LIR 2 and penalizes actors in category LIR 1. 

Question 1: why are the customers of LIR 2 more important than the customers of LIR 1?
Question 2: why wouldn't LIR 1 form a new company and call it a startup to get privileged access to addresses? Or, might LIR 3, LIR 1's long standing competitor, form a new LIR to gain an advantage in the competition for resources? 

One could argue for your position by noting that LIRs who already have some blocks of ipv4 are in a position to economize on and/or NAT those addresses, whereas an ISP without any can't do that. That provides some answer to Q1. But it doesn't deal with the problems around Q2.