

QoS and DDoS mitigation in IXP







Quality of Service

Different traffic treatment for different services

- **Best-effort** default
- Assured forwarding reserved bandwidth
- **Expedited forwarding** low latency (priority)

Input classification and output queueing

What it has to do in neutral IXP infrastructure

Network Control - priority and reserved bandwidth





QoS on Peering only Member port

Output Queueing

Best effort for everything **Network Control** for BGP (and ARP)





QoS on Peering + Multicast

Multicast is used for real-time Audio/Video transport Highly sensitive for packet loss and variable delay (jitter)

Output Queueing

Best effort for Peering
Network Control for BGP
Expedited forwarding for Multicast





QoS on Multi-service Member port

Private VLANs normally carry more important traffic than peering

Output Queueing

Best effort for Peering Network Control for BGP Expedited forwarding for Multicast Assured forwarding for Private VLANs





QoS with DDoS mitigation

Reserve zero bandwidth for possible DDoS traffic

Output Queueing


Best effort for possible DDoS **Assured forwarding** for other Peering **Network Control** for BGP

Expedited forwarding for Multicast **Assured forwarding** for Private VLANs





Congestions on Member ports



- Routing change
 - policy
 - public peering as backup of private peering
- Increased traffic
 - live events
 - software updates
- DDoS attacks





Detecting Congestion Cause

SFlow / Port Mirroring

PMacct ElasticSearch Zabbix





DDoS Attacks

Low-and-Slow DDoS attack protocol and application layer

High packet rate DDoS attacks

TCP syn, DNS, HTTP/S spoofed traffic

Solutions: hardware/software solutions, BCP.38

Volumetric DDoS attack overflow transport links to the victim

Amplification **Bot networks**





DDoS Patterns

Application	Protocol	Port
Invalid	UDP	
Chargen	UDP	7
DNS	UDP	5
NTP	UDP	12
SNMP	UDP	16
U Discovery	UDP	1000
Memcache	UDP	1121
SSDP	UDP	1900

Most attacks last less than 2 minutes Multiple protocols

Amplification

- Request from spoofed IP address of the victim
- Large response to target





DNS DDoS attacks

DNS is important but low bandwidth traffic (Less than 10 Mbps on whole IXP) **Multiple Gbps during attack**

Solution: Policing


Classify UDP with source 53 exceeding 50 Mbps on all ports as potential DDoS

Same solution for other patterns






DDoS attack w/o congestion








DDoS attack causing congestion








Real Attack in Monitoring






DDoS Queue Dropped in pps


DDoS Queue Queued in pps






Real Attack in Monitoring







Peering Queue Dropped in pps - 0

Peering Queue Queued in pps

Peering Queue traffic in Gbps



			26.11 23:15	10
00.00	1	00.11	26.11 23:15	http://www.zabbix.co
lene	erate	d in	0.61	sec.









DDoS Solution

Pros & Cons





DDoS solution pros



Dotlp mark on output traffic

- Always on, works for shot time frame attacks
- Whole network protected, including core links





DDoS solution cons



Minimal possibility for classifying useful traffic as DDoS



Zero-day DDoS Attacks



Output Queue on Reseller ports (Applied on port not VLAN)



Remote Peering Ports with lower speed than port speed





DDoS solution future development Ideas



Whitelisting



Calculate IP Address reputation





Port speed shaping (Member configured in my.bix.bg)

Per-VLAN queueing on Carrier/Reseller ports







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