

# Policy Certification and Verification for Cybersecurity in the IoT

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# Why were we interested in this?

They may listen to you  
(e.g., smart speakers)



- They can (by definition) access the Internet and therefore may expose private information

They may know what you watch (e.g., smart TVs)



- Lack of understanding on what information they expose, on when they expose it, and to whom

- Lack of understanding of regional differences (e.g., GDPR)

Technology

Amazon  
You Te

A global team  
assistant res



D

A secret  
door  
to spying

Smart TV Snooping Features


## Looping Features

Smart TVs collect data about what you watch with a technology called ACR. Here's how to turn it off.

210 devices in  
different  
countries



# Data Collection Methodology



- Monitor all traffic at the **router**
  - per-device
  - per-experiment


# Motivation

- In 2023 the Cyber Resilience Act (in EU) and the US Cyber Trust Mark (in US) make further step towards a certification program of smart devices
- For consumer IoT devices, the certification process is thought as a self-assesment performed by the vendors themselves
- Should we trust vendors?




# Solution at the Edge

### Goal 1: methodology



### Goal 2: measurement



### Goal 3: mitigation

- / Generalizable
- / Self adaptive
- / Accurate IoT blocker

# Compliance-Oriented IoT Security and Privacy Evaluation Framework

**Cybersecurity guidelines\*** such as ENISA, NIST, *IoT Regulation Policy (UAE)* have been released for improving IoT design practice



**Privacy regulations\*\*** such as GDPR (in EU) and CCPA (in California)

**There is a lack of understanding whether IoT devices comply with them**

\*NOT mandatory

\*\*Mandatory

# Methodology







# Results

Device	# of Unused Open Ports	# of Unrecognized Protocols	Compliant with GDPR Art. 32 (a)
Bose Speaker	✗ (11 ports)	✓ (0 protocols)	✓
Echo Dot 5	✗ (5 ports)	✗ (3 protocols)	✓
Furbo Dog Camera	✓ (0 ports)	✗ (1 protocol)	✓
Google Nest Cam	✗ (3 ports)	✗ (1 protocol)	✓
Govee lights	✓ (0 ports)	✓ (0 protocols)	✓
Ring Video Doorbell	✓ (0 ports)	✗ (2 protocols)	✓
Sensibo Sky Sensor	✓ (0 ports)	✓ (0 protocols)	✓
SimpliSafe Cam	✗ (1 ports)	✓ (0 protocols)	✓
Sonos One	✗ (5 ports)	✗ (1 protocol)	✗ (mac in the clear)
WeeKett Kettle	✗ (1 ports)	✗ (2 protocols)	✓

# Methodology



# Using ML for inferring IoT behavior



# Results

REPLAY ATTACK RESULTS. ✓ INDICATES WHETHER THE REPLAY ATTACK IS SUCCESSFUL OR NOT (X).

Device (*Tested via APIs)	Non-Restart Scenario	Restart Scenario
Yeeligh lightstrip	✓	✓
Yeelight bulb	✓	✓
Wiz lighbulb	✓	✓
Lifx bulb	✓	✓
Lepro bulb	✓	✓
Govee lightstrip *	✓	✓
Nanoleaf triangle *	✓	✓
Tapo smartplug	✓	X
Meross smartplug	✓	✓
WeeKett Kettle	✓	✓
Eufy robovac 30C	✓	✓
OKP vacuum	✓	✓
iRobot roomba i7	X	X
Sonos Speaker *	✓	✓
Bose Speaker *	✓	✓
Wyze cam pan	X	X
Vtech baby monitor	X	X
Boyfun Baby monitor	X	X
Furbo camera	X	X
Meross Garage Opener	✓	✓

# What's Next?




## Privacy Preserving IoT Security Management

- Real industrial gateway
- Real-world trial



## Mitigation

- Open source software
- Third party certification
- Manufactures Guidelines



## Privacy and Security Label/Certification

- Privacy and security by default
- IETF/ETSI Standard

# Our Team



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